Cabo Ligado Weekly: 29 May-4 June 2023

Jun 7

Written By Cabo Ligado

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By the Numbers: Cabo Delgado, October 2017-June 2023 ¹

Figures updated as of 2 June 2023. Political violence includes Battles, Explosions/Remote violence, and Violence against civilians event types. Violence targeting civilians includes Explosions/Remote violence and Violence against civilians event types where civilians are targeted. Fatalities for the two categories thus overlap for certain events. ACLED is a living dataset and figures are subject to change as new information becomes available.

Total number of political violence events: 1,645
Total number of reported fatalities from political violence: 4,688
Total number of reported fatalities from political violence targeting civilians: 2,003

All ACLED data are available for download via the data export tool and curated data files.

Situation Summary

Last week saw little insurgent activity and was marked mainly by incidents reflecting a lack of discipline among the Mozambican Defense and Security Forces (FDS). The only reported insurgent sightings were in Macomia district, where bands of fighters continue to circulate along the coast around Pangane unchallenged by the FDS.

On 31 May, in Mocímboa da Praia town, a man, known as Kiloba, was physically assaulted in the cemetery area of the Pamunda neighborhood by a drunk FDS member. The soldier asked Kiloba to accompany him to the barracks after buying cigarettes and beat him when he refused.

In Salaue, in Ancuabe district, members of the Mozambique Defense Armed Forces (FADM) and the police Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR) got into a fight, allegedly over women, and exchanged gunfire, panicking the local population, a local source claimed. No casualties were reported. Security forces in the area are renowned for disorderly behavior. On 24 May, a FADM soldier assaulted a pregnant woman in Silva Macua, also in Ancuabe. In early April, one source reported that UIR members in Salaue had harassed, beaten, and abducted civilians while intoxicated.

Such incidents are likely to further strain relations between civilians and security forces. This strain was manifested in Mocímboa da Praia town on 30 June when a group of people attacked an alleged agent of the criminal investigation service after the agent threatened a member of the public, Carta de Moçambique reported.

Meanwhile, despite the continued presence of insurgents around Pangane in Macomia, the FDS is doing little to intervene and only asks locals not to sell large amounts of food to insurgent fighters, according to a local source. Insurgents, on the other hand, appear to freely associate with local civilians, buying basic necessities and encouraging displaced people to return. The FDS tries to gather intelligence from villagers but does not pursue the insurgents as they are not threatening the people, the source told Cabo Ligado.

Weekly Focus: Islamic State Financing

A recent report from the Bridgeway Foundation sheds light on Islamic State (IS) finance networks in east, central, and southern Africa that support the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The authors have enjoyed access to “defectors,” and documentation from “third-party” sources, including financial transfer receipts, bank records, and interview records. This has allowed them to present findings on the mechanism, scale, and destination of certain money transfers with some confidence. The report, produced in collaboration with the Program on Extremism at George Washington University, gives some indication of where the insurgency in Mozambique sits within these networks.

The authors examined transfers made between September 2019 and October 2021. They describe a “regionally pooled funding,” wherein funds are raised within the region, and distributed to allies and affiliates through a network of companies and individuals. The network was maintained through the IS Somalia-managed Karrar hub in Somaliland, which gives oversight to agents operating in South Africa, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, and Somalia. The funds came from robbery, kidnapping, and extortion, mostly in Somalia and South Africa.

Transfers examined were through hawala and mobile money transfer systems, and, surprisingly often, by physically couriering large amounts of cash. Hawala money transfer systems are particularly difficult to police. Built on trust developed through personal or business ties, hawala allows for large sums to be deposited with one agent, and almost immediately withdrawn from a cooperating agent elsewhere. Balance reconciliation through related companies with no overt involvement in money transfers makes it particularly hard to detect. Transfers examined by the authors, and undertaken between September 2019 and February 2021 were exclusively through hawala. Subsequent transfers to October 2021 were either by courier or mobile money. It is unclear if this was due to improved policing, or a function of the dataset.

Of almost 350 million US dollars in transfers in which Bridgeway has some confidence, less than 2%, was for Mozambique. The report shows two payments made to Mozambique in October 2019, both by hawala. One was to Nampula for US$3,000, and the other to Maputo for US$2,366. Both payments were made from Nairobi. Uganda accounts for 80% of the value of examined transfers, being in support of the ADF, with over 10% going to the United Arab Emirates, known for the presence of IS financial networks. Tanzania accounted for just over 6%, with less than 1% going to Kenya.

Bridgeway’s research has relied on the cooperation of the security branches of DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda. Such cooperation was presumably not forthcoming from Tanzania and Mozambique. Tanzania, in particular, has strict research protocols that, in recent years, have been diligently implemented. This may explain the low share of transfer value accounted for by the authors for the two countries. It may, however, also reflect the effectiveness of both countries in countering organized transnational armed groups and their supporting networks.

The report gives a potted biography of Abdella Hussein Abadigga, an Ethiopian in South Africa. Abadigga was sanctioned by the United States in March 2022 for recruitment for IS, and management of funds for the group. Curiously, the report does not mention that his family claim he was kidnapped by South African security agents on 29 December in a Midrand shopping mall. A court ordered the state to reveal his whereabouts in response to the family’s plea. Only the South African National Defence Force has responded, saying it had no knowledge of the incident.

Weekly Round-Up

Total security head visits Cabo Delgado

Denis Favier, the head of TotalEnergies security, concluded a three-day visit to Mozambique’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) project site in Afungi last week. Favier visited the resettlement village of Quitunda, where 52 houses are soon to be handed over to residents of Quitupo village, the only inhabited village within the LNG concession area. He also met with Brigadier General Estevão Francisco, the head of the Mozambican Joint Task Force (JTF) stationed in Afungi. On 2 June, Favier also met with Mozambique Minister for National Defense Cristóvão Chume and reiterated the need for the JTF to continue defending the LNG site. Favier, a former head of the French Gendarmerie, has visited Afungi several times since 2019.

CDD report warns withdrawal of Mozambican JTF threatens national sovereignty

A new report by the Mozambican Center for Democracy and Development (CDD) asserts that the recommendations in the Jean-Christophe Rufin report on human rights in Cabo Delgado would mean replacing the Mozambican JTF at Afungi with a Rwandan force, which could undermine Mozambique’s national sovereignty. However, CDD’s concern appears to be based on a misreading of the Rufin report, which does not call for the withdrawal of Mozambican troops, only that TotalEnergies should cease paying for the JTF as it implicates the company in the conflict.

President Kagame shakes up security leadership

Rwandan President Paul Kagame dismissed two long-serving senior Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) officers on 7 June, as well as 14 other officers and 228 soldiers of lower ranks. This followed a reshuffle at the top of the security forces announced on 5 June.

On 5 June, a number of senior security appointments were announced. Most important of these was the replacement of General Jean Bosco Kazura as Chief of Defence Staff by Lieutenant-General Mubarakh Muganga. General Kazura had been in the position since November 2019. For Mozambique, the most significant change was the appointment of Major-General Alex Kagame (no relation) as the new Joint Task Force Commander in Mozambique. He replaces Major-General Eugene Nkubito, who had been in the position since August last year.

The terms “Joint Force” and “Joint Task Force” are both used by Rwandan authorities to describe the deployment of the RDF and Rwanda National Police in Mozambique. This can create confusion with FADM’s Joint Task Force stationed in Palma. This shared terminology has likely added to the confusion over the future role of FADM’s JTF.

The initial reshuffle on 5 June was seen as normal practice of rotation to forestall the development of a power center in the military. The later dismissals suggest that perhaps such a power center was developing.

IDPs boost voter registration numbers in Cabo Delgado municipalities

Voter registration for this year’s municipal elections in Mozambique ended on Saturday 3 June, amid accusations that as many as 1.5 million people, particularly in opposition-leaning areas in central and northern Mozambique, had been unable to register. In Cabo Delgado, however, many more people registered than had been predicted.

The surprisingly high numbers of voters in Cabo Delgado’s municipalities of Pemba, Mocímboa da Praia, Ibo, Chiure, and Balama can be attributed at least in part to the dynamics of the conflict. Villagers in areas hit by the conflict have moved in large numbers to towns and cities, particularly Pemba but also the island of Ibo. Of late, many people in Mocímboa da Praia and Palma districts have been encouraged to move to the town of Mocímboa da Praia. This trend of urbanization has manifested itself in registration numbers for the upcoming municipal elections.

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