Cabo Ligado Weekly: 9-15 January 2023

Jan 17

Written By Cabo Ligado

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By the Numbers: Cabo Delgado, October 2017-January 2023 ¹

Figures updated as of 13 January 2023. Political violence includes Battles, Explosions/Remote violence, and Violence against civilians event types. Violence targeting civilians includes Explosions/Remote violence and Violence against civilians event types where civilians are targeted. Fatalities for the two categories thus overlap for certain events.

Total number of political violence events: 1,571
Total number of reported fatalities from political violence: 4,563
Total number of reported fatalities from political violence targeting civilians: 2,007

All ACLED data are available for download via the data export tool and curated data files.

Situation Summary

Last week began with a series of clashes between insurgents and security forces in Macomia and Muidumbe districts. Shots were exchanged on Sunday 8 January near Litandacua, 5 km south of the Messalo river where a joint force of Mozambican and Southern African Development Community (SADC) troops was ambushed on their way to an insurgents’ base. An Islamic State (IS) statement claimed that insurgents injured several soldiers and captured military equipment, including a surveillance drone, a picture of which was published in IS-affiliated newspaper al-Naba.

The next day saw two confrontations north of the river. In Mandava, Muidumbe, contact between Mozambique Defense Armed Forces (FADM) and insurgents was reported, with local sources suggesting there were fatalities on both sides. IS claimed to have killed one in addition to capturing weapons and ammunition. Meanwhile, in Nguida, Macomia, another clash took place, but no casualties were reported, although IS again claimed to have captured weapons and ammunition.

In the early hours of 10 January, insurgents initiated the most significant clash of the week, attacking a FADM garrison at Xitaxi in Muidumbe, less than 10 km from the border with Macomia. Fighting reportedly continued until about 9:30 am, by which time at least three FADM soldiers lay dead; one source claims as many as six were killed. Pictures posted on IS social media taken in the aftermath of the attack show three bodies in military fatigues lying around the garrison, which had been set on fire.

Al-Naba reported that on the day of the attack, insurgents managed to improvise a roadblock on the N380 road connecting Macomia and Muidumbe. The report included a photo of armed men posing on the road in broad daylight. It is not clear how long the insurgents managed to control the road, but a local source said large queues of vehicles were waiting at the Awasse junction at the other end of the N380 as there were no military escorts available due to fighting further north.

IS also claimed to have targeted a FADM convoy with an explosive device, machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenades as it drove through Litamanda on 10 January. This has not been corroborated by other sources so far, but insurgents have used improvised explosive devices in the past, most recently at Xitaxi on 15 September.

The sharp uptick in attacks last week coincides with an allied offensive named Vulcão IV that has been underway in Macomia and Muidumbe since 1 January, according to FADM.

Weekly Focus: Tanzanian Court Records Shed Light on Regional Networks

Another judgment from Tanzania’s High Court in December 2022 sheds light on the challenge that extremist networks present to Tanzania, and the region. Evidence from court cases demonstrates how authorities are faced with extremist networks from different theaters – Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Somalia. Southern Tanzania is one place where, it seems, these networks overlap.

The case featured in Cabo Ligado last week involved recruitment for Cabo Delgado. This week’s case concerns the terror threat within Tanzania, and saw evidence presented of radicalization and recruitment in Songea town in Ruvuma region going back to 2014, and recruitment for Somalia.

The threat outlined in the most recent case is serious – a plan to undertake a suicide bombing at a Catholic church. The accused, now serving 30 years in prison, was the victim of his own bomb on the night of 11 May 2020, according to evidence presented in court. The bomb went off or was set off – evidence is unclear – in a playing field near a Catholic church in Songea town, the administrative headquarters of Ruvuma region in southern Tanzania.

The court judgment is of particular interest for extracts from an interview with the accused. It is recorded that he stated that he was first approached in 2014 about involvement in Somalia by a figure who sold Muslim wear at a mosque in Songea town. It is further recorded that he was encouraged to go to Somalia for training, though he would have to contribute approximately 120 US dollars. He never went but says he knew of men who did. At the end of 2015, according to the record of the interview in the judgment, he was first taught how to prepare a homemade bomb. His teacher was a madrasa teacher in the town.

The bomb he detonated in May 2020 was his fourth attempt, according to the judgment. Whether he, or others in his network, were involved in a grenade attack on police in Songea in 2014 is not known. His recorded statement says that he was inspired by a recording of a Kenyan preacher who said that suicide during an attack on church or government targets would earn him rewards in the afterlife. This may well have been a recording of the late Aboud Rogo of Mombasa, whose recordings are not only used in official al-Shabaab propaganda, but are also popular amongst IS supporters in the region.

Whether the accused, known as Mbuko, identified with any particular transnational extremist group, or rather with a local network of friends and accomplices driven by violent jihadist ideology is not clear. We know from research conducted in Mozambique that much traffic related to the insurgency passes through Ruvuma region, and likely through Songea town where Mbuko lived. From the Mozambican side too it has been established that the insurgency has long had strong connections to DRC.

This cat’s cradle of individuals and support networks is an important aspect of the challenge presented to local authorities, national governments, and foreign powers. This is illustrated by the arrest in Nangade district of three Tanzanians from Kigoma in Nangade in December. Kigoma, bordering Burundi by land and DRC by Lake Tanganyika, is the gateway to eastern DRC. Mbuko’s acquaintances set off for Somalia in 2014 or 2015. IS’s dominance of communications on Cabo Delgado should not let us think those routes serving other armed groups are closed.

Weekly Round-Up

Rwandan Forces Deploy to Ancuabe

Following the insurgents’ tumultuous offensive through Cabo Delgado’s southern districts beginning in the middle of last year, Rwandan security forces confirmed last week to have extended their deployment to Ancuabe. The Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) and Rwanda National Police will be responsible for assisting Mozambican forces in providing security for this district while continuing with their operations in Palma and Mocímboa da Praia.

This is a notable development. No international force had been assigned to Ancuabe as it had not experienced significant insurgent activity prior to June 2022. The last confirmed incident was reported in October, but security forces cannot allow themselves to be caught off guard again, especially given the district’s strategic location between the port of Pemba and Cabo Delgado’s lucrative ruby and graphite deposits in Montepuez and Balama. Ancuabe is also home to several substantial mining projects of its own, including the Triton Minerals Grafex graphite mine, which was attacked by insurgents when they invaded the district in June, and the Gemrock ruby mine, which was attacked in October.

The RDF has previously carried out joint operations beyond its own sectors, such as at Chai in Macomia, but this is the first time any one of the international forces in Cabo Delgado has assumed responsibility for a whole new sector since those forces arrived in Mozambique in July 2021. This deployment, therefore, represents an opportunity for the Rwandans to reinforce their reputation as the only competent military actor in the conflict, especially at this moment when SADC is investigating itself for a possible breach of international law (see below). Nonetheless, the fact that this new deployment is necessary represents a broader failure of the security forces, both domestic and international, to contain the insurgency.

SADC Forms Board of Inquiry to Investigate Burning Bodies Video

Last week, a video appeared online featuring a group of soldiers throwing the bodies of two presumed insurgents onto a pile of burning rubble, in violation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions which stipulate that the bodies of enemy combatants are not to be desecrated. The video is said to have been filmed in the Nkonga forest in Nangade last November, and it features at least one South African soldier, whose flag is visible on his arm, but soldiers of other SADC armies may also have been involved.

SADC and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) condemned the behavior in the video within a day of its circulation and have supported the formation of a board of inquiry, under the auspices of the SADC commander in Cabo Delgado, to investigate the incident. South African news reported that a team of SANDF representatives, including members of the army’s legal department, arrived in Pemba on Friday 13 January. SADC has promised that the results of the investigation will be made public as soon as it has been concluded.

Significant Increase in Return in Cabo Delgado

The total number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the conflict has passed the one million mark, according to the International Organization for Migration’s (IOM) most recent survey released last week. More positively, the survey reveals a significant increase in returnees.

Round 17 of IOM’s Mobility Tracking Assessment records 1,028,743 IDPs, of whom 935,130 are in Cabo Delgado. Of those, over one-fifth are in Pemba. Nampula province is host to almost 90,000 while the balance is to be found in Niassa province. Over 70% are in host communities rather than displacement centers.

The most striking figure from the assessment is the increase in return. IOM has identified 335,197 returnees in Cabo Delgado, which represents a significant increase of 146% since the last survey in June 2022. The top three reasons given for return were perception of safety, better living conditions, and family reunion. Sites of return have not been specified in the announcement, but are likely to be concentrated in Palma and Mocímboa da Praia.

For IDPs in Cabo Delgado, needs remain stark, according to IOM. Food is their greatest lack, followed by official personal documentation, housing and protection, and primary education for their children.

Locals Complain of Mistreatment by Police in Nangade

Relations between Mozambique’s Defense and Security Forces (FDS) and the local population in Cabo Delgado remain problematic in places, particularly, it seems, in Nangade district. Provincial Governor Valige Tauabo visited Nangade last week, as part of a tour that also took in Muidumbe, Mueda, and Ibo. At a public meeting in Nangade, he reportedly asked three people to give their opinion on life in the district. One of them complained openly about how the FDS physically abused locals in the area. After Governor Tauabo left, the police took the man, known as Tuvaluva, into custody for a few hours; he was only released after community leaders intervened.

Another recent report backs up Tuvaluva’s testimony. Carta de Moçambique reports that a local trader in Nangade was abducted on the night of Saturday 14 January, in Nangade, with the attackers thought to be members of the police’s Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR). Another trader is now living in Pemba for his own safety, having avoided an attempt by UIR agents to abduct him on 25 December. Carta’s report added that other traders who have been returning from Tanzania, where they had sought refuge from the conflict, are regularly being shaken down for money by UIR agents, who justify this behavior by alleging that the traders are associated with the insurgency.

Mozambique Military’s Mixed Messages

Mozambique’s military may have created some confusion with its messaging around the Vulcão IV operation, originally announced by FADM on 3 January as having started on 1 January. While sources in Macomia district said they had seen no evidence of the operation, ACLED data indicate a significant uptick in clashes between insurgents and allied forces in Macomia and Muidumbe districts since the first week of December, and continuing into last week.

On 11 January, another FADM statement, circulated through unofficial channels, claimed that 14 insurgents had been killed, including a leader of the insurgency named Abu Fadila. The news was also reported by state television TVM reporter Brito Simango on Facebook. Simango then soon deleted the post, and declared on Facebook that the story was “fake news” – a post he then also rapidly deleted. An official at the defense ministry confirmed for Zitamar that the news was fake.

However, shortly afterwards, Simango re-published the news on Facebook, saying it had been confirmed by a defense ministry official. He explained the flip-flopping by saying there had been some small errors in the first version – apparently, FADM had only confirmed 12 insurgents dead, rather than the 14 originally claimed.

No new version of the FADM press release has been published, however, and nor does it feature on the army’s Facebook page, where the first release announcing Vulcão IV was published.

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